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Abstract 12 
Behaviour benefiting others (prosocial behaviour) can be motivated by self-interested 13 
strategic concerns as well as by genuine concern for others. Even in very young children 14 
such behaviour can be motivated by concern for others, but whether it can be strategically 15 
motivated by self-interest is currently less clear. Here, children had to distribute resources 16 
in a game in which a rich but not a poor recipient could reciprocate. From four years of age 17 
participants strategically favoured the rich recipient, but only when recipients had stated an 18 
intention to reciprocate. Six- and eight-year-olds distributed more equally. Children 19 
allocating strategically to the rich recipient were less likely to help when an adult needed 20 
assistance but was not in a position to immediately reciprocate, demonstrating consistent 21 
cross-task individual differences in the extent to which social behaviour is self- versus 22 
other-oriented even in early childhood. By four years of age children are capable of 23 
strategically allocating resources to others as a tool to advance their own self-interest. 24 
Keywords: Prosocial behaviour; self-interested social behaviour; resource distribution; 25 
helping; preschoolers  26 
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1. Introduction 27 
Humans display unusually high levels of behaviour benefitting even unrelated others, 28 
because others tend to reciprocate (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). This functional explanation 29 
does not, however, solve the question of the psychological mechanisms that cause such 30 
prosocial behaviour (de Waal, 2008). It can be motivated by strategic self-interested 31 
concerns such as expectations of reciprocation, but also by feelings of genuine sympathy, 32 
and debate continues as to the nature of the complex interplay between concerns for self 33 
and others (Stich, Doris, & Roedder, 2010). The developmental perspective necessary to 34 
understand this interplay is missing, however, because although there is evidence that 35 
sympathetic concern motivates prosocial behaviour in very young children (Hepach, Vaish, 36 
& Tomasello, 2013; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Warneken & Tomasello, 2009), 37 
it is less clear whether self-interested strategic concerns can motivate their prosocial 38 
behaviour. 39 
An investigation of strategic social behaviour in preschoolers would also be highly 40 
revealing because such behaviour requires advanced socio-cognitive problem solving 41 
abilities that are not otherwise clearly evident in children of this age (Green & Rechis, 42 
2006; Rubin & Rose-Krasnor, 1992). An individual difference approach would also be 43 
valuable in this context because while clear individual differences in strategic social 44 
behaviour are seen in adults and school-age children (Jones & Paulhus, 2009; Steinbeis, 45 
Bernhardt, & Singer, 2012; Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1996), nothing is known about these 46 
differences’ earlier developmental roots. The current study fills these gaps. 47 
Motivations for young children’s prosocial behaviour are diverse (Paulus & Moore, 2012). 48 
Apart from sympathy, other factors include socialization (Brownell, 2013; Brownell, 49 
Svetlova, Anderson, Nichols, & Drummond, 2013), fairness concerns (Paulus & Moore, 50 
2012), and the desire to participate in the activities of others (Rheingold, 1982). 51 
Furthermore, there are observations consistent with the hypothesis that preschoolers, like 52 
older children (Repacholi, Slaughter, Pritchard, & Gibbs, 2003; Steinbeis et al., 2012), may 53 
engage in strategic prosociality. Specific patterns of prosocial and aggressive behaviour 54 
correlate with social dominance in a manner suggesting that preschoolers use prosocial 55 
behaviour to mitigate the negative consequences of aggression (Hawley, 2002; Hawley & 56 
Geldhof, 2012; Roseth et al., 2011). When choosing how to share, preschoolers take into 57 
account factors that are of strategic importance, for example by sharing more with those 58 
who were themselves generous or worked hard or are friends (Kanngiesser & Warneken, 59 
2012; Paulus & Moore, 2012). Audience effects are very suggestive: five-year-olds are 60 
more generous when they are observed (Engelmann, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2012; 61 
Leimgruber, Shaw, Santos, & Olson, 2012). While such selective prosociality is clearly 62 
functionally strategic, it is not yet fully clear that it is psychologically motivated by 63 
strategic cognition such as concern for reputation or reciprocation. Such functional social 64 
behaviour can also be subserved by automatic mechanisms (Bargh, Schwader, Hailey, 65 
Dyer, & Boothby, 2012) such as automatic tendencies to give more to those you like or to 66 
behave more prosocially when observed. Audience effects can be unconscious in adults 67 
(Haley & Fessler, 2005; Nettle et al., 2013) and even cleaner fish cheat less when cleaning 68 
in the presence of bystander client fish (Pinto, Oates, Grutter, & Bshary, 2011). 69 
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Here we conduct an experiment in which strategic resource allocation is possible but can 70 
only arise from an explicitly strategic motivation. This is because participants must 71 
consider not only the presence or absence of others, but also their material ability to 72 
reciprocate (Experiments 1 and 2), and whether or not they state an intention to reciprocate 73 
(Experiment 2). Participants play a game with two experimenters. One round consists of 74 
each player in turn using a token (if they have one) to buy from a vending machine a plastic 75 
egg containing either one or two candies (ostensibly at random but in fact in a 76 
predetermined sequence). One candy is always kept, but an extra candy must be given to 77 
either of the other players (Fig. 1). If the hypothesis that children are able and motivated to 78 
engage in strategic resource allocation holds, then they are predicted to prefer to allocate 79 
candies to participants who have access to tokens and who have stated an intention to 80 
reciprocate. Experimenters’ access to tokens is manipulated in experiments 1 and 2 and 81 
their stated intention to reciprocate is manipulated in experiment 2. 82 
 83 
Fig. 1. A participant handing a candy to the token-rich experimenter. 84 
We also examine whether there are consistent individual differences in the extent to which 85 
social behaviour is self- or other-oriented that produce individually consistent behaviour 86 
across different situations with the possibility for prosocial behaviour. Although such 87 
consistent individual differences have not previously been found in young children 88 
(Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010, 2013; Paulus, Kühn-Popp, Licata, Sodian, & Meinhardt, 89 
2013; Thompson & Newton, 2013), their presence in older children and adults indicates 90 
that they might exist (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). Participants are tested 91 
for their tendency to spontaneously help an adult in need, a behaviour that has been argued 92 
to be motivated by concern for others (Hepach et al., 2013; Warneken & Tomasello, 2009). 93 
We use a helping test in which there is little motive for strategic helping as reciprocation is 94 
unlikely to be forthcoming because the adult is not present when helped. If individuals 95 
consistently differ across tasks in the extent to which their choices concerning social 96 
behaviour are self- versus other-oriented, then helping in this situation is predicted to 97 
correlate negatively with strategic distribution in the sharing game. 98 
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We test four-year-olds; the procedure would presumably be extremely challenging for 99 
younger children because of their limited understanding of others’ verbally expressed 100 
intentions (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). We also test older children to explore the 101 
competing influences of different developmental processes: older children are able to be 102 
more strategic because of improved cognitive skills (Steinbeis et al., 2012), but might act 103 
less strategically because of increased commitment to fair distribution (Damon, 1994; 104 
Gummerum, Hanoch, & Keller, 2008). 105 
2. Experiment 1 106 
2.1. Method 107 
Fifty-two participants were clustered in three age-groups: 16 four-year-olds (7 girls, M = 50 108 
months, SD = 3), 24 six-year-olds (11 girls, M = 80 months, SD = 3), and 12 eight-year-109 
olds (5 girls, M = 98 months, SD = 3). Two additional six-year-olds were tested but 110 
excluded from analysis due to experimenter error. One four-year-old and two six-year-olds 111 
were included in analysis of the sharing game but excluded from analysis of spontaneous 112 
helping because of parental interference, likewise one six-year-old because of experimenter 113 
error. 114 
Participants first observed the three-player sharing game. A model experimenter played two 115 
rounds with a token-rich and a token-poor experimenter, going first and sharing first with 116 
one then the other (counterbalanced), without justifying her choices. The rich and poor 117 
experimenters (identities counterbalanced) shared one candy each with the model, saying “I 118 
usually share with those who share with me, and [the model] shared with me, so I’m 119 
sharing with her”. On the turn they were not shared with, the rich and poor experimenters 120 
obtained eggs with only one candy. 121 
After the demonstration rounds the model left and the participant took her place (Fig. 1). 122 
The rich experimenter and the participant had many tokens left but the poor experimenter 123 
had now run out. Seven rounds were played, with the child always receiving an egg with 124 
two candies and therefore choosing who to share with, the rich experimenter receiving eggs 125 
with only one candy, and the poor experimenter saying that because she had no tokens she 126 
must skip her turn. The only exception was on turn four: the poor experimenter found a 127 
final token in her pocket, and to allay suspicions the game was rigged, both experimenters 128 
received an egg with two candies which they shared with the participant because “[the 129 
participant] shared with me”. The procedure establishes that both experimenters intend to 130 
reciprocate, and that the rich experimenter is likely to be able to do so, without either 131 
experimenter actually reciprocating more often than the other. At turn four a minority of 132 
participants had not in fact shared with both experimenters, and it was therefore not always 133 
true that “[the participant] shared with me”, but supplementary analyses in which trials after 134 
this event were excluded produced the same results, see Supplementary Online Material 135 
(SOM). 136 
Participants might favour the rich experimenter for reasons other than strategy, preferring 137 
for example individuals who are lucky or control resources (Hawley, 2002; Olson, Banaji, 138 
Dweck, & Spelke, 2006). To control for this participants were asked to leave their final 139 
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token with either the rich or poor experimenter when it was time to go as they did not have 140 
time to use it. Non-strategic reasons for preferring the rich individual, but not strategic 141 
reasons, predict that the final token will also be allocated to the rich individual. 142 
After the sharing game, participants were tested for their tendency to spontaneously help. 143 
Immediately after the final round of the sharing game, the poor experimenter received a 144 
telephone text-message that both experimenters must leave immediately. Hurrying to leave, 145 
the poor experimenter knocked over the rich experimenter’s cup of tokens, commenting 146 
that she had no time to pick them up. Helping was scored if the participant began picking 147 
up tokens in the 45s before the experimenter returned. Further details of participants, 148 
procedure and analysis are available as SOM. 149 
2.2. Results 150 
Consistent with the hypothesis that children strategically choose to favour a rich individual 151 
who has the potential to reciprocate, across ages participants allocated more candies to the 152 
rich experimenter than the poor, t(51) = 2.19, p = .033, d = .30 (Fig. 2). Candies allocated 153 
to the rich experimenter was not clearly predicted by age, t(45) = 1.65, p = .106 154 
(generalized least squares model), unstandardized beta = -.21, 95% CI [-.47, .04]. Younger 155 
participants did however show a greater deviation from equal division between the 156 
experimenters, demonstrated by a negative correlation between age and the absolute 157 
difference from 50:50 distribution, F(1,50) = 7.13, p = .010, R2 = .12 (linear regression). 158 
When leaving the experiment, 88% of participants gave their final token to the poor 159 
experimenter, meaning they were less likely to favour the rich experimenter in the final 160 
token allocation than they were to favour the rich experimenter with most candies in the 161 
sharing game, p < .001 (McNemar test). Non-strategic explanations for favouring the rich 162 
experimenter were therefore unlikely. 163 
  164 
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 165 
Fig. 2. Percentage frequency histograms of candies allocated to the rich experimenter in 166 
Experiment 1, with means and associated 95% CI. The asterisk indicates significant 167 
deviation from equal distribution between the rich and poor experimenters (p < .05). 168 
 169 
We had hypothesised that children who are more likely to use resource allocation as a self-170 
interested strategic tool are less likely to help when immediate reciprocation is unlikely to 171 
be forthcoming. This predicts a negative correlation between helping and allocating to the 172 
rich experimenter, and indeed, controlling for age, participants who did not help had shared 173 
more candies with the rich experimenter, t(45) = 2.93, p = .005, d = .88 (generalized least 174 
squares model, see SOM for details). Inclusion of the age * helping interaction in the model 175 
revealed no effect, t(44) = .23, p = .820, meaning there was no evidence that the relation 176 
between helping and allocating to the rich experimenter depended on age (Table 1). 177 
Helping did not depend on age, Wald Z = 1.38, p = .169 (binary logistic regression, Table 178 
1). 179 
 180 
Table 1.  181 
Participants who spontaneously helped allocated fewer candies to the rich experimenter 182 
irrespective of age. 183 
   Mean number of 7 candies allocated to rich experimenter 
Age 
(years) n 
% who 
helped Participants who helped Participants who did not help 
4 15 47 4.1 5.4 
6 21 67 3.4 4.3 
8 12 67 3.2 4.5 
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 184 
3. Experiment 2 185 
Experiment 2 was designed to test whether the results of Experiment 1 could be replicated 186 
in a group composed only of four-year-olds, and to include an improved control by varying 187 
the stated sharing intentions of the rich and poor experimenters. In the reciprocal condition, 188 
as in Experiment 1, the experimenters stated an intention to reciprocate. In the control 189 
condition, the rich and poor experimenters instead stated an intention to share with one 190 
another. In the control condition there could therefore be no incentive to strategically share 191 
with the rich experimenter, but other reasons to prefer the rich experimenter apply to both 192 
conditions. Our prediction was therefore that participants would favour the rich 193 
experimenter more in the reciprocal than the control condition. The two conditions are 194 
implemented both between and within subjects, with a condition switch half-way through 195 
the game. The between subjects comparison of distribution prior to the switch was most 196 
important. This was because within subject differences were expected to be weaker as 197 
children of this age find switching to cope with new circumstances challenging (Anderson 198 
& Reidy, 2012; Zelazo, 2006) and also because for practical reasons the condition switch 199 
was demonstrated with fewer trials than the establishment of the first condition. The within 200 
subject aspect of the design was nevertheless included as an exploration of children’s 201 
potential ability to switch. 202 
3.1. Method 203 
Participants were 48 four-year-olds (21 girls, M = 48 months, SD = 1) randomly divided 204 
into two groups beginning in the reciprocal or control conditions. Three addition 205 
participants were tested but excluded from analysis, two due to parental or sibling 206 
interference and one due to an insufficient grasp of Swedish. Three participants were 207 
excluded only from analysis of spontaneous helping due to ambiguous behaviour (see 208 
below). 209 
The reciprocal group procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, with minor changes 210 
including the addition of a third demonstration round (see SOM). Four test rounds were 211 
conducted in a first test phase. The control condition differed from the reciprocal condition 212 
only in that rather than sharing reciprocally with the model during the demonstration phase, 213 
the rich and poor experimenters shared with each other, saying “I usually share with my 214 
best friend, and [the other experimenter] is my best friend, so I’m sharing with her”.  215 
During the fourth round, after the participant’s turn, the condition was switched. As in 216 
Experiment 1, both experimenters received an extra candy to share, but rather than sharing 217 
according to the intentions they stated during the demonstration phase, they both switched 218 
to sharing in the opposite way, explaining: “Now I have changed my mind about how I 219 
share. From now on I will…” either “…share with my best friend, and [the other 220 
experimenter] is my best friend, so I’m sharing with her” (switching from reciprocal to 221 
control) or “…share with those who share with me, and [the participant] shared with me, so 222 
I’m sharing with her” (switching from control to reciprocal). Four rounds were conducted 223 
in this second test-phase. At switching from control to reciprocal, a minority of participants 224 
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were potentially confused because they had not in fact shared with both experimenters. 225 
Supplementary analyses in which these participants were excluded did not alter the results 226 
(see SOM). Coding of participants’ potential protest at the experimenters’ failure to share 227 
with them when switching from the reciprocal condition was aborted after coding 10 228 
participants because no verbal protest was observed, although negative facial expressions 229 
were observed in 3 of these participants. 230 
The spontaneous helping task was the same as in Experiment 1 but an addition was made to 231 
the coding procedure to accommodate a new behaviour observed in three participants. 232 
These participants (one in the reciprocal-condition-first group) picked up the tokens but 233 
then later spontaneously attempted to or stated an intention to use them for themselves. 234 
Because it was therefore ambiguous whether they were helping or planning theft when they 235 
first picked up the tokens, they were excluded from analysis of helping. All participants 236 
who picked up tokens and who did not attempt or state an intention to use them for 237 
themselves had replaced the refilled token cup on the table and were therefore coded as 238 
unambiguously helping. 239 
3.2. Results 240 
Our first-test-phase prediction that reciprocal condition participants would favour the rich 241 
experimenter more than control condition participants was confirmed, t(45) = 2.29, p = 242 
.027, d = .66 (Fig. 3). Furthermore, in the first-test-phase reciprocal condition participants 243 
allocated more to the rich than poor experimenter, t(23) = 2.08, p = .049, d = .42. One 244 
participant, prior to allocating to the rich experimenter, said to the poor experimenter 245 
“you’ve got no tokens so I’m not sharing with you”. 246 
Participants beginning in the reciprocal condition allocated less candies to the rich 247 
experimenter after the switch, t(23) = 2.07, p = .050, d = .42 (Fig. 3). Some children who 248 
had anticipated reciprocation from the rich experimenter therefore stopped favouring the 249 
rich experimenter after the expected reciprocation did not occur. Participants beginning in 250 
the control condition did not change their distribution pattern at all between the phases, 251 
allocating exactly the same number of candies to the rich experimenter both before and 252 
after the switch (Fig. 3). 253 
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 254 
Fig. 3. Percentage frequency histograms of candies allocated to the rich experimenter in 255 
Experiment 2, with means and associated 95% CI. n = 24 per group. Asterisks indicate 256 
significant deviation from equal distribution between the rich and poor experimenters 257 
within conditions, and significant between-condition comparisons (p ≤ .05). 258 
 259 
Because there is no evidence for strategic allocation after the condition switch, we compare 260 
the tendency to spontaneously help with distribution in the first test-phase only. In the 261 
reciprocal condition, the prediction of a negative correlation between helping and allocating 262 
to the rich experimenter was again confirmed: the 40% of participants who did not help had 263 
allocated more candies to the rich experimenter than those who did help, MNotHelped = 3.10, 264 
95% CI [2.47, 3.73]; MHelped = 2.23, 95% CI [1.57, 2.89]; t(20) = 2.12, p = .047, d = .88. 265 
Participants who did not help had shown a very strong tendency to favour the rich 266 
experimenter, t(9) = 3.97, p = .003, d = 1.26. As expected, there was no such negative 267 
correlation between helping and allocating to the rich experimenter in the control condition, 268 
MNotHelped = 1.70, 95% CI [.74, 2.66]; MHelped = 1.60, 95% CI [.76, 2.44]; t(17) = .18, p = 269 
.861 (50% of participants helped). 270 
4. General discussion 271 
In four- to eight-years-olds’ resource allocation, favouring of an individual was contingent 272 
on the individual’s ability to reciprocate (Experiments 1 and 2) and on the individual’s 273 
intention to reciprocate (Experiment 2). Favouring of a rich individual ceased after the 274 
individual reneged on the intention to reciprocate (Experiment 2) and was negatively 275 
correlated with helping (Experiments 1 and 2). This converging evidence clearly indicates 276 
that targets for resource allocation were chosen strategically in children as young as four. 277 
It is known that children as young as three or four are able to choose appropriate problem 278 
solving strategies for familiar social situations such as negotiating inclusion in group 279 
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activities or resource access or by lying to avoid disapproval (Polak & Harris, 1999; 280 
Webster-Stratton & Lindsay, 1999; Ziv, 2013). Here it is further established that four-year-281 
olds can spontaneously and strategically generate a novel strategy which maximises their 282 
gain in a novel social situation. Because there was no positive feedback for favouring the 283 
rich experimenter, participants must have created the strategy from scratch (or arrived at it 284 
by creative adaptation of known strategies) and then chosen to adopt the strategy because of 285 
its expected results. 286 
Models of social problem solving (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Rubin & Rose-Krasnor, 1992; 287 
Semrud-Clikeman, 2007) also include the ability to re-evaluate a chosen strategy following 288 
unexpected results. In Experiment 2 participants stopped favouring the rich experimenter 289 
following her failure to reciprocate (because of the condition switch) which indicates that 290 
four-year-olds are also capable of such re-evaluation. Having chosen to distribute 291 
strategically, participants changed to equal distribution when they learned the initial 292 
strategy could no longer succeed. Participants apparently no longer saw a reason to deviate 293 
from norms of equal distribution, but their change in distribution may also have reflected 294 
frustration at the rich experimenter. 295 
In participants instead experiencing a switch from the control to reciprocal condition, no 296 
change in behaviour was observed. For practical reasons the procedure establishing the 297 
condition switch at phase 2 was briefer than the establishment of the condition at phase 1. It 298 
makes sense that the brief switch procedure was sufficient to inform participants already 299 
expecting reciprocation that such reciprocation would not in fact be forthcoming, but not 300 
sufficient to establish the more novel concepts of reciprocation and the possibility of its 301 
exploitation. Adapting to this latter switch type is more demanding, and strategy switches 302 
are inherently demanding for children of this age (Anderson & Reidy, 2012; Zelazo, 2006). 303 
Whereas four-year-olds tended to favour the rich experimenter, only a minority of six- and 304 
eight-year-olds did so, with the majority distributing as equally as possible. The reduced 305 
tendency with age towards favouritism of either experimenter was statistically clear, and 306 
there was a marginal trend for older children to allocate less to the rich experimenter. 307 
Together these results suggest that older children may have been more concerned with 308 
equal distribution, a result which would be consistent with a range of previous findings 309 
concerning the development of attitudes towards distributive justice (Gummerum et al., 310 
2008; Paulus & Moore, 2012; Rochat et al., 2009). This development has been argued to 311 
arise from older children’s increased understanding of normative principles of fairness 312 
(Damon, 1994). However, it has also been observed that three-year-olds and even infants 313 
have some understanding of fairness (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Paulus & Moore, 2012; 314 
Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012; Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun, & Burns, 2013). 315 
Conversely, in older children distribution can be very strategic (Steinbeis et al., 2012) and 316 
the relative importance of different types of fairness principles applied can depend on 317 
context (Gummerum et al., 2008). Together with the current result that strategic behaviour 318 
is established early, these observations suggest that the transition with age towards more 319 
equal distribution may be motivated by strategic concerns regarding personal reputation 320 
(Engelmann, Over, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2013; Shaw, 2013) as much as by an 321 
increased commitment to the moral principle of fairness. 322 
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There are some potential limitations to the generality of our results because they concerns 323 
children’s behaviour in one particular laboratory task. Cues indicating the possibility of 324 
reciprocation were explicitly verbal, and participants were compelled to allocate a resource 325 
to one of two individuals. It is not clear from this result how much strategic sharing would 326 
be observed in circumstances in which giving is optional or the possibility of reciprocation 327 
is less obvious. We note, however, that previous studies in which children have chosen 328 
whether or not to behave prosocially and in which cues were less explicit have provided 329 
results that were suggestive, if not conclusive, of strategically motivated prosocial 330 
behaviour (Engelmann et al., 2012; Hawley, 2002; Leimgruber et al., 2012; Rochat et al., 331 
2009; Roseth et al., 2011). Furthermore, one very recent study closely parallels the current 332 
study by demonstrating that five-year-old participants were more generous to a second 333 
party in the presence of a third-party observer if the observer would later have an 334 
opportunity to share with the participant (Engelmann et al., 2013). In contrast to here, that 335 
study demonstrates general reputation management rather than direct reciprocation 336 
elicitation: participants could not distribute to the observer, so they were concerned with 337 
appearing generous rather than with directly benefitting a potential reciprocator. Because 338 
distributing participants were nevertheless sensitive to observers’ ability to subsequently 339 
share with them, however, the study provides independent confirmation of preschoolers’ 340 
ability to strategically distribute resources, beyond a simple audience effect. 341 
Because prosocial behaviour is potentially self- or other-oriented, the motivation for such 342 
behaviour inside and outside the laboratory is frequently ambiguous. The current study 343 
finds evidence for both types of motivation. Although distribution by the youngest children 344 
was frequently motivated by concern for self, evidence for other-orientation across all age-345 
groups and in both experiments comes from comparison with the spontaneous helping task: 346 
those who were more likely to spontaneously help were less likely to evidence self-347 
orientation when allocating. Although alternative explanations for such a correlational 348 
result cannot be completely ruled out (for example, helpful individuals might be less able to 349 
think strategically) the most likely interpretation is that individuals expressed a 350 
comparatively higher or lower other-orientation in both tasks. This conclusion is interesting 351 
for several reasons. A number of previous studies have found no correlations between 352 
young children’s different prosocial behaviours such as instrumental helping, comforting, 353 
and generosity, and have found evidence for separate neural substrates, indicating that 354 
separate motivations underlie these different forms (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010, 2013; 355 
Paulus et al., 2013; Thompson & Newton, 2013). The current result indicates that there is in 356 
fact in preschoolers a degree of overlap in the motivation of different behaviours which 357 
benefit others in different ways, in that resource distribution and instrumental helping were 358 
both affected by a general other-orientation. 359 
The current result is also of interest because although some have argued that young 360 
children’s instrumental help is genuinely based on concern for others (Warneken & 361 
Tomasello, 2009), others have argued that alternative explanations are similarly plausible 362 
(Paulus & Moore, 2012). The correlation of instrumental helping with a reduced tendency 363 
to deviate from fair treatment of others for self-interested reasons indicates that concern for 364 
others does sometimes play a role in four-year-olds’ instrumental helping. 365 
Kenward et al. 
  12 
Although the existence of individual differences in general self- versus other-orientation 366 
has received little support from previous studies of preschoolers, studies of adults and older 367 
children have provided some evidence for stable cross-situation individual differences in 368 
prosocial behaviour (Penner et al., 2005). Furthermore, stability in prosocial behaviour has 369 
been found through early childhood (Kienbaum, 2014) and a modest degree of stability 370 
from childhood into adulthood (Eisenberg et al., 2002; Nantel-Vivier et al., 2009). 371 
Associations have been found between sympathy, moral cognition, and other-oriented 372 
behaviour, even in six-year-olds (Malti, Gummerum, Keller, & Buchmann, 2009), lending 373 
further plausibility to the current finding. One study found individual consistency in one-374 
year-olds’ behaviour across different resource distribution tasks (Sommerville et al., 2013). 375 
It is important to note, however, that individual differences in general other-orientation do 376 
not imply that clear correlations will be found across all relevant tasks, because situation-377 
specific individual differences and cognitive constraints may be stronger (as is evident from 378 
previous work on preschoolers). Here, we note that although favouring of the rich 379 
experimenter correlated with a lack of helping in the reciprocal condition, there was no 380 
correlation in the control condition. Although the control condition offered no incentive to 381 
strategically favour the rich experimenter, individuals who are more other-oriented and who 382 
therefore help more might have been expected to be more likely to compensate the poor 383 
experimenter by favouring them. In general, however, there was no evidence for systematic 384 
favouring of the poor experimenter. This is consistent with previous results showing that 385 
children during the primary school years gradually transition from emphasising equal 386 
distribution irrespective of context towards also taking prior individual needs into account 387 
(Frederickson & Simmonds, 2008; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991). The current data 388 
supports the view that the tendency to deviate from fair distribution to help the needy 389 
develops after the preschool years, even in comparatively other-oriented individuals. 390 
The negative relation between strategic distribution and helping did not depend on age, and 391 
indeed a reduced tendency to spontaneous help among those showing a greater tendency to 392 
strategic prosociality is also seen in adults (Wilson et al., 1996). In adults, manipulative 393 
prosocial behaviour does not correlate with intelligence or empathy (Jones & Paulhus, 394 
2009; Wilson et al., 1996), implying individual differences in strategic prosociality are 395 
primarily due to motivation rather than ability. The sources of the differences identified 396 
here are uncertain. We note that environmental factors contribute to some differences in 397 
very young children’s prosocial behaviour (Brownell, 2013; Brownell et al., 2013). There 398 
are also genetic determinants of prosocial behaviour in adults and children (Ebstein, Knafo, 399 
Mankuta, Chew, & Lai, 2012; Lewis & Bates, 2011), and even indications of a genetic 400 
component to strategic prosocial behaviour in adults (Jones & Paulhus, 2009; Wilson et al., 401 
1996).  402 
Evolutionary models indicate that highly self-interested human social behaviour is only 403 
successful at a low population-frequency (Mealey, 1995). In the light of this, it is 404 
noteworthy that self-interested strategic resource distribution was quite infrequent here in 405 
the older children. The sources of the different motives for seemingly altruistic behaviour in 406 
humans is a fascinating question which is only beginning to be resolved and which requires 407 
a continuation of this developmental individual-differences approach. 408 
Kenward et al. 
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